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SUBJECT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, FACT SHEETS ON
PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH ON NONPROLIFERATION AND SECURITY
ISSUES

11. These materials have been approved by the National Security Council for use by Posts in response to press and host government queries regarding President Obama's April 5 speech on nonproliferation in Prague.

12. Posts are authorized to use the points and fact sheets below in addressing questions that may arise after the April 5 nonproliferation speech. Please note that background information is solely for Posts' information and should not/not be used with press.

13. Questions and Answers follow in paragraphs 3-18, fact sheets on several of these issues are located in paragraphs 19-21.

13. NATO Enlargement:

Question: What is the administration's position on the future enlargement of NATO; should it continue? What are the limits of "Europe"?

-- We just affirmed at the NATO Summit that NATO's door remains open. The United States remains committed to NATO enlargement. We welcome the accession of Albania and Croatia.

-- Current and future aspirants must demonstrate a commitment to NATO's values and meet the Alliance's performance-based standards before becoming members; there are no shortcuts to the process.

Background: NATO's performance-based enlargement process has been an historic success in strengthening the Alliance, promoting peace and security, and advancing freedom and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. At the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, Allies welcomed Albania and Croatia as NATO's newest members, increasing the total numbers to twenty-eight Allies. At the same time, many Allies are starting to evince an anti-enlargement sentiment. The countries currently seeking NATO membership are Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Ukraine. Although Allies were prepared to invite Macedonia to join NATO at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, Greece blocked the invitation over the ongoing dispute over Macedonia's name. Allies agreed that Macedonia would join NATO as soon as the name issue was resolved. Allies did not grant Georgia's and Ukraine's requests to start the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process at Bucharest; however, Allies agreed at the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest that Ukraine and Georgia "will become members of NATO." NATO Foreign Ministers decided in December 2008 that the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions should take forward the necessary work that those countries will need to undertake to prepare for NATO membership.

14. NATO's Mission in Afghanistan (Role of Czech

Republic)

Question: How does the U.S. assess the Czech contribution in Afghanistan?

-- The Czech Republic has made vital contributions and sacrifices in Afghanistan.

-- The Czech Republic's leadership of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Logar Province is evidence of its commitment to Alliance goals in Afghanistan and its valuable role in fulfilling those goals.

-- Both at the March 31 International Conference on Afghanistan in The Hague and at the April 3-4 NATO Summit, the U.S. and the Czech Republic affirmed a shared strategy in Afghanistan.

-- The Czech Republic, as current President of the European Union, has also taken on a strong leadership role and moved to strengthen the EU's efforts in providing observers for the upcoming Afghan elections, supporting the rule of law and police development, and providing development assistance.

If raised: Should the Czech Republic be doing more?

-- Every Ally must make its own decisions on the

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SUBJECT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, FACT SHEETS ON PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH ON NONPROLIFERATION AND SECURITY resources it can commit. The Czech Republic plays a vital role in Logar Province that directly benefits the Afghan population.

Background: In March 2008, the Czechs established a new Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Logar Province in U.S.-led Regional Command-East (RC-E). In addition to the civilian personnel at the PRT, there are 580 Czech troops in Afghanistan (13 Mar ISAF placemat). The Czechs have donated six helicopters, refurbished with NATO funds, to the Afghan National Army. In March 2009, RC-E Deputy Commanding General in charge of support for troops Brigadier General James McConville told the Czech press their contribution to PRT Logar was adequate and appropriate. Czech military personnel have suffered three deaths in Afghanistan. Parliament has authorized the Czech military to maintain troops in Afghanistan through the end of 2009. The fall of the Czech government last month makes any additional Czech contributions to Afghanistan in the near future unlikely. The Czech Republic sets an example for larger Allies in maintaining approximately four percent of its total forces on deployment at any given time.

15. NATO-Russia Council

Question: What goals and expectations do you have regarding NATO-Russia re-engagement, as called for by NATO Foreign Ministers?

-- We are determined to use the NATO-Russia relationship to enhance European security by engaging in candid political dialogue, both where we agree and disagree, and through focused cooperation in areas of common interest, such as Afghanistan and counter-terrorism.

-- We encourage Russia and NATO Allies to work together to transform this relationship into a real partnership that can achieve concrete results. Real cooperation between NATO and Russia can contribute significantly to security in Europe and indeed globally.

Background: In 2002, NATO and Russia established the

NATO-Russia Council (NRC) - a forum designed for consultation, consensus-building, and cooperation. It was conceived as a greatly enhanced successor to the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, set up under the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act to assuage Russian concerns about the first post-Cold War round of NATO enlargement. But the NRC has not lived up to its potential. Most projects barely developed or were politicized. Russian opposition to NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, and to U.S. missile defense plans, coupled with Russia's "suspension" of the CFE Treaty (i.e., decision not to perform its obligations under the treaty), further reduced common ground. Russia's military action in Georgia in August 2008 led Allies to suspend formal high-level meetings of the NRC. On March 5, NATO Foreign Ministers agreed to formally resume the NRC, including at the Ministerial level, after the April Summit. Allies seek to use the NRC as a forum for dialogue, where we agree and disagree, and for cooperation in areas of common interest. Still, Allies are divided regarding Russia's intentions and the value of cooperation. We hope to use the NATO Summit to find a balance for NATO-Russia that advances positive engagement where interests overlap, while defending our principles.

16. START and Follow-on Agreement

Question: Can you comment on the Joint Statement issued by Presidents Obama and Medvedev regarding the negotiation of a START follow-on agreement?

-- The Presidents agreed that bilateral negotiations would be initiated with the intention of reaching a new, comprehensive, legally binding agreement on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace the START Treaty, which is set to expire on December 5, 2009.

-- The Presidents have instructed that the subject of the new agreement be the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, that the U.S. and Russia seek to record in the new agreement levels of reductions that will be lower than those in existing arms control agreements, and that the new agreement include effective verification measures drawn from the experience of the Parties in implementing START.

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-- In addition, the Presidents stated that the new agreement should mutually enhance the security of the Parties, and predictability and stability in strategic offensive forces.

-- The Presidents further charged their negotiators to report, by July, on their progress in working out a new agreement.

Question: Is there sufficient time available to negotiate a new follow-on agreement before the START Treaty expires in December?

-- Negotiating a new agreement before December will be a challenge; the Administration is committed to the effort to ensure that an agreement that serves U.S. security interests and enhances stability is achieved by then.

Question: There have been press reports that the Administration may consider going as low as 1000 nuclear warheads. Is this true?

-- The Obama Administration is committed to seeking deep, verifiable reductions in all U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons. As a first step, the

Administration is committed to seeking a legally binding agreement to replace the current START Treaty.

-- As long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, the United States must maintain a strong deterrent in support of U.S. national security and that of our friends and allies.

Question: When will negotiations begin?

-- The Presidents have directed that the talks begin immediately. The U.S. negotiating team will be headed by the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and Implementation.

Background: Media coverage of the meeting between Presidents Obama and Medvedev in London, and the joint statement by the Presidents, have raised interest worldwide regarding the efforts by the United States and Russia to negotiate a START follow-on agreement. There has also been widespread speculation regarding the level of reductions that would be achieved in the new treaty. Thus far the U.S. and Russia have discussed broad policy objectives that would guide the negotiations. The negotiations will deal with the specific elements of an agreement, including the level of reductions.

17. Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Question: Please elaborate on plans to ratify the CTBT.

--The United States recognizes the importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty as a nonproliferation and disarmament measure.

--We believe that it is in the U.S. interest to ratify the Treaty. The Administration will work closely with the U.S. Senate to win its advice and consent to ratification of the CTBT.

Background: The United States and the Russian Federation both signed the CTBT on September 24, 1996. While the Russian Federation ratified the CTBT on June 30, 2000, the U.S. Senate declined to give its consent by a vote 48 in favor of ratification and 51 against in 1999. The United States and the Russian Federation are two of the 44 countries required to ratify the Treaty in order for it to enter into force. For CTBT to enter into force, the United States, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, and Israel must ratify it and India, Pakistan, and the DPRK must both sign and ratify it. Vice President Biden will guide the Administration effort to pursue ratification of the CTBT.

18. Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)

Question: For the past decade, the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to begin work on negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. One obstacle to this has been U.S. insistence on an FMCT without international verification provisions. Will the United States support the negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament?

-- The negotiation of a verifiable FMCT is the top

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-- The United States hopes that its renewed flexibility on this issue will enable negotiations to start soon in Geneva.

-- The United States looks forward to working with the Russian Federation and other CD members to overcome any obstacles preventing the commencement of FMCT negotiations in the CD.

Background: A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) briefly held negotiations on an FMCT in 1998, with the objective of producing a verifiable treaty. However, the CD was unable to agree to resume work in the years following. In 2004, the United States, after an internal review, announced its conclusion that an effectively verifiable FMCT was not achievable. In 2006, the United States proposed the negotiation of an FMCT without international verification provisions, and tabled a draft FMCT text and a draft negotiating mandate. Although the principal reason for the continued failure of the CD to move forward on FMCT negotiations may be the belief by some states that they need to continue fissile material production for weapons programs, some other states use the U.S. position against including international verification provisions in an FMCT as a supposed reason for their opposition. During her confirmation hearings, the Secretary of State said that the United States will work to revive negotiations on an effectively verifiable FMCT.

9. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

Question: What importance do you attach to the 2010 Review Conference, and what steps will you take in order to avoid a repeat of the failure of the 2005 Review Conference?

-- The United States places the utmost importance on the NPT, which is the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The review process affords Parties the opportunity to examine the operation of the Treaty to help ensure that its purposes and provisions are being realized.

--We hope that the 2010 RevCon will demonstrate that the Treaty will continue to be an effective legal and political barrier to nuclear proliferation. We will strive for a recommitment by Parties to the objectives of the NPT and to their basic shared interest in preventing proliferation.

-- We will also seek a Conference that helps set a new course in the direction of the greater fulfillment of the vital goals of the Treaty - stemming proliferation, working toward a nuclear-free world, and sharing the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy.

Background: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Parties meet to review the operation of the Treaty every five years. These meetings are viewed as important reflections of the strength of the NPT and the nonproliferation regime in general. The last such meeting in 2005 was filled with acrimony over key issues such as disarmament, non-compliance, and nonproliferation in the Middle East and failed to reach agreement on a consensus document. Increasing attention is being given to the 2010 Review Conference as a key milestone in the process of repairing and strengthening the regime.

10. Nuclear Fuel Cycle (International Fuel Bank)

Question: Has the U.S. already taken steps toward creation of an international fuel bank?

-- The United States believes that providing reliable access to nuclear fuel is a way to allow countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increasing the risks of nuclear proliferation through the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies.

-- The United States has already been working through the IAEA and other multilateral forums

toward this end and a number of complimentary proposals have been developed.

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-- One near term goal is to have the IAEA Board of
Governors begin debate this June on concrete plans
for providing reliable access to nuclear fuel,
including one for a Russian fuel bank in Angarsk
and one for implementation of an IAEA operated fuel
bank as proposed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative.
We hope that mechanisms can be approved in
September.

Background: The United States has worked cooperatively
with a number of western countries on developing
proposals for reliable access to nuclear fuel (RANF) as
a means of providing countries a viable alternative to
developing sensitive nuclear technologies. We were part
of a six country concept in 2006 (also involving France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Russia and the UK) that
proposed to establish a mechanism at the IAEA that could
be used in the event that commercial supply arrangements
are interrupted for reasons other than nonproliferation
obligations, and cannot be restored through normal
commercial processes. The U.S. is establishing a
national fuel reserve with uranium downblended from
excess defense material. We expect the June meeting of
the IAEA's Board of Governors to consider a Russian
proposal to establish a reserve of low-enriched uranium
(LEU) to be held at Angarsk and released at the
direction of the IAEA. We also support the Nuclear
Threat Initiative's proposal to match funds for the
establishment of an IAEA fuel bank. President Obama
voted for a \$50 million appropriation to DOE for the
U.S. contribution to such a bank when he was in the
Senate. Now that the IAEA has received pledges for over
\$150 million, we expect the June Board meeting to
consider specific mechanisms to implement an IAEA fuel
bank.

11. North Korea

Question: What is our response to reports that North
Korea will launch a TD-2 missile?

-- We have long expressed our concerns regarding North
Korea's ballistic missile programs.

-- North Korea's development, deployment, and
proliferation of ballistic missiles, missile-related
materials, equipment, and technologies pose a serious
threat to the region and to the international community.

-- We are concerned about North Korea's stated intention
to launch a missile. The President has discussed this
issue with leaders during his visit to Europe.

-- Such a launch would be provocative and a violation of
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718,
which requires that North Korea suspend all activities
related to its ballistic missile program and that it
abandon its ballistic missile program in a complete,
verifiable and irreversible manner.

-- If North Korea were to go forward with this launch,
the U.N. Security Council and the international
community would have to respond appropriately.

-- We call on the DPRK to refrain from provocative
actions, and to cease immediately the development and
proliferation of ballistic missiles, as required by
UNSCR 1718.

Q: What is our response to reports that North Korea

launched a TD-2 missile?

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Q: How does this launch affect the Six Party Talks?

-- We call on North Korea to continue to uphold its commitments under the Six-Party Talks and to work with the other parties to implement the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement.

-- Our goal remains the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Background: North Korea has announced its intention to launch an "experimental communications satellite" between April 4-8, 2009. The United States believes that this action would violate UNSCR 1718, which obligates the DPRK to suspend all ballistic missile-related activities and re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching.

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¶12. Iran

Question: What is your new policy on Iran?

-- As the President stated in his March 20 remarks during Nowruz to the Iranian people and leadership, we are committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran and the international community.

-- We are engaging our friends and partners to chart an effective path, notably last week in London by the President and his top advisors.

-- We are committed to diplomacy to engage the Islamic Republic in a constructive, honest dialogue to resolve our differences.

--But this does not mean that Iran's violations of its international nuclear obligations cease to have consequences.

-- There are five UN Security Council resolutions that reflect the international community's continuing serious concerns about Iran's nuclear program.

-- We have publicly stated that we want Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations and we mean that. Iran has rights, but with rights come responsibilities.

-- We are prepared to take real steps toward a very different and positive future. But Iran must take steps too. We hope Iran does not miss an opportunity.

Background: Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapons capability through both uranium enrichment and a heavy water reactor. The UN Security Council has adopted five resolutions (1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1835), three of which include legally binding sanctions. The IAEA has reported as recently as March 2009 that Iran has not cooperated to resolve the outstanding questions, including those about past activities on weaponization.

¶13. UNSCR 1540

Question: What is the United States doing to support UNSCR 1540 implementation?

-- UNSCR 1540 is a vital element in global efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD and to keep these horrific weapons out of the hands of terrorists.

-- Implementation of UNSCR 1540 by all UN Member States will help ensure that no state or non-state actor is a source or beneficiary of WMD proliferation.

-- Both U.S. and Russia intend to give new impetus to the implementation of UNSCR 1540. As permanent Member States of the UN Security Council, both our countries work actively to promote and assist with UNSCR 1540 implementation.

Background: UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) established an obligation for all UN Member States to take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent WMD proliferation and their means of delivery. The UN's 1540 Committee works to facilitate states' compliance with the Resolution and to report back to the Security Council on progress on its implementation. The U.S. works within and in coordination with the 1540 Committee, sponsoring many 1540 workshops, training events, and assistance programs designed to help all states strengthen their capabilities to prevent WMD proliferation. Russia also sits on the 1540 Committee. Plans are underway for all UN Member States to participate in a Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540 implementation at the end of 2009.

¶14. G8 Global Partnership

Question: What is the U.S. doing to support implementation of the G-8 Global Partnership, including efforts to expand the geographic scope beyond Russia/FSU?

-- We have made great progress in reducing the threat posed by proliferation and terrorism through the G-8 Global Partnership.

-- The threat is global. We want to make tangible progress to expand the scope of the G-8 Global

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-- We also want to make progress in securing new GP Partners.

Background: The G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) was created in 2002 at the G-8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada, to improve international security by preventing WMD proliferation and terrorism. Envisioned as a \$20 billion commitment over 10 years - with the U.S. committing \$10 billion of the total pledge - concrete projects were initially funded in Russia and the former Soviet Union (FSU). The GP now consists of all G-8 nations plus 13 additional nations and the European Union. While pledged GP activities continue in Russia/FSU, the U.S. has worked since 2004 to expand GP assistance beyond Russia/FSU to address emerging WMD threats.

¶15. Enhancing Nuclear Security/Material Reduction

Question: What is the content of the new initiative, how will the goal be achieved and are more resources going to be committed.

--The United States has been making progress in securing nuclear materials in Russia and in other countries, but more can and must be done and more quickly.

--We will expand our partnership with other countries, increase the capabilities of the IAEA, and hold a Global Nuclear Security Summit within the next year.

--We will examine existing programs and look for ways

to accelerate our efforts and increase efficiency.

Background: The President has said that the threat of nuclear terrorism is the greatest threat facing the American people and has announced an ambitious goal of securing sensitive nuclear materials around the world in four years. He has asked the Vice President to lead the administration's efforts to achieve this goal.

16. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

Question: How does the U.S. envision the Global Initiative being strengthened in 2009-2010, and what role does the U.S. envision Russia, as co-chair to the Global Initiative, to play in strengthening the Global Initiative?

-- In keeping with priorities agreed on in 2008 among partners, the U.S. envisions an active partner nation focus on denying terrorist safe havens, preventing terrorist financing, and strengthening nuclear detection and forensics during the 2009-2010 period.

-- The U.S. and Russia also co-chair the Exercise Planning Group, which promotes use of exercises to test capabilities and enhance overall preparedness through a multi-year exercise program.

Background: The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which is co-chaired by the U.S. and Russian Federation, is recognized as a key component of U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear security relations both within the USG and internationally, and is an important symbol of commitment within the Global Initiative community. Working together, the U.S. and Russia have mobilized over 70 nations to improve national and regional capabilities to combat nuclear terrorism. The U.S. and Russia often conduct joint demarches to encourage Global Initiative partners to host or participate in Global Initiative events, thus strengthening cooperation and collaboration among partner nations in building and exercising capabilities to combat the global threat of nuclear terrorism. The Netherlands will host the June 2009 Plenary Meeting, where senior level officials will discuss past Global Initiative activity successes and determine future objectives for the Global Initiative.

17. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Question: What are President Obama's views on the PSI?

--The President strongly supports the PSI. The

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Background: The PSI is an informal and voluntary effort by countries (currently 94) that have committed to cooperate in halting transfers of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The Administration wants to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of the PSI. Efforts are underway to broaden participation by all PSI endorsing states in PSI capacity-building activities (exercises, workshops, training, experts' meetings, etc.). We are also continuing outreach to encourage additional states to endorse the PSI.

18. Missile Defense Cooperation

Question: What are the current U.S. plans for missile defense deployments in Europe?

-- The Administration is currently conducting a missile defense policy review. We will continue to consult closely with the Czech and Polish governments, and our other NATO allies, on U.S. plans.

-- As the United States and our allies together pursue the issue of missile defense in Europe, we will take into account a number of factors: whether the system works, whether it is cost effective, and the nature of the threat from Iran.

-- If, by working with our allies, Russia, and other countries, we succeed in eliminating the threat, then the driving force behind a missile defense construction in Europe will be removed.

-- We remain ready to consult with our NATO allies, and with Russia, to see if we can develop new cooperative approaches to missile defense which protect all of us.

Question: What effect will the March 26 resignation of the Czech government have on the missile defense agreement with the Czech Republic?

-- It is premature to comment on the impact to our bilateral missile defense cooperation. We will work with any Czech government to continue to strengthen the security of Europe against new threats.

Background: The Administration will support MD, but ensure that its development is pragmatic and cost effective. Iran is steadily developing and testing ballistic missiles of increasingly greater ranges, payloads, and sophistication. Senior U.S. officials have said that if the Iranian threat is eliminated, then the driving force behind the U.S. MD deployments to Europe will be removed. Senior Administration officials also have said that the United States hopes to continue to work closely with NATO and Russia on MD in a cooperative and transparent manner, and to develop and deploy MD assets capable of defending the United States, NATO, and Russia against 21st century threats.

19. Fact Sheet: START and Follow-on Agreement

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)

The START Treaty was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in Moscow on July 31, 1991. Five months later, the Soviet Union dissolved and four independent states with strategic nuclear weapons on their territory came into existence -- Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. On May 23, 1992, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine assumed the obligations of the former Soviet Union under the START Treaty as successor states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine also committed in the Lisbon Protocol and its associated documents to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states.

Central Limits: START required reductions in strategic offensive arms to be carried out in three phases over seven years from the date the Treaty entered into force. All Treaty Parties met the December 5, 2001, implementation deadline. The central limits include:

- 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers)
- 6,000 accountable warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers

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--4,900 warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs
--1,540 warheads on 154 heavy ICBMs
--1,100 warheads on mobile ICBMs
--Ballistic missile throw-weight limited to 3,600 metric tons on each side
Counting Rules: U.S. heavy bombers may carry no more than 20 long range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) each. The first 150 of these bombers count as carrying only 10 ALCMs each. Russian heavy bombers may carry no more than 16 ALCMs each. The first 180 of these bombers count as carrying only eight ALCMs each. Each ALCM-equipped heavy bombers in excess of 150 for the U.S. and 180 for Russia would count as actually equipped. Heavy bombers equipped only with bombs or short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) are counted as carrying one warhead each.
Verification: START contains detailed, mutually-reinforcing verification provisions that were intended to supplement National Technical Means, including: data exchanges and notifications on strategic systems, facilities, and flight tests; exchanges of telemetry data from missile flight tests; restrictions on the encryption of telemetry data; twelve types of on-site inspections and exhibitions; and continuous monitoring at mobile ICBM final assembly plants.
Implementation: The Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) was established by START to oversee the Treaty's implementation. The JCIC has met more than 30 times and has completed numerous agreements on detailed procedures for specific implementation activities, including resolving questions arising from the initial data exchanges and exhibitions of strategic offensive arms.
Duration: START is scheduled to expire on December 5, 2009, unless superseded by another arms reduction agreement, or extended by agreement of the Parties.
Follow-on Agreement

On April 1, Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed in London that bilateral negotiations would be initiated with the intention of reaching a new, comprehensive, legally binding agreement on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace the START Treaty by the end of 2009.

The Presidents have instructed that the subject of the new agreement be the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, that the U.S. and Russia seek to record in the new agreement levels of reductions that will be lower than those in existing arms control agreements, and that the new agreement include effective verification measures drawn from the experience of the Parties in implementing START.

In addition, the Presidents stated that the new agreement should mutually enhance the security of the Parties, and predictability and stability in strategic offensive forces.

The Presidents further charged their negotiators to report, by July, on their progress in working out a new agreement and have directed that the talks begin immediately.

The U.S. negotiating team will be headed by the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation.

120. Fact Sheet: Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

President Obama has stated that his Administration will aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), after a thorough review of the technical, military and diplomatic issues surrounding the treaty.

The CTBT was submitted to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification on September 23, 1997 along with

an article-by-article analysis, an assessment of its verifiability, and other required supporting documentation. In 1999, the U.S. Senate declined to give its advice and consent to the CTBT by a vote of 48 favoring ratification to 51 against. The CTBT remains pending before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and can be taken up by the Committee at any time.

Over the decade since the Senate last considered the CTBT, new developments have occurred in both monitoring technology and verification techniques, as well as assessments of the ability of the United States to maintain the safety and reliability of its nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing. The Administration

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will conduct a full review of these developments before it decides how best to pursue ratification of the CTBT. The CTBT was negotiated in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) between January 1994 and August 1996. The United Nations General Assembly voted on September 10, 1996, to adopt the Treaty by a tally of 158 in favor, 3 opposed, and 5 abstentions. Since September 24, 1996, the Treaty has been open to all states for signature and ratification before its entry into force. One hundred eighty (180) nations have now signed it, and 148 have ratified it. Of the 44 nations whose ratifications are specifically required by the CTBT for its entry into force, 41 have signed and 35 have ratified. Any nation can accede to the Treaty at any time after its entry into force, enabling its participation to be universal.

CTBT's Central Features

Basic obligations. The CTBT would ban any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. Organization. The Treaty establishes an organization -- the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) -- to ensure implementation of the Treaty's provisions, including the provisions for international verification measures. The organization includes a Conference of States Parties, an Executive Council, and a Technical Secretariat, which includes the International Data Centre.

Structure. The Treaty includes two Annexes, a Protocol, and two Annexes to the Protocol, all of which form integral parts of the Treaty. Annex 1 to the Treaty assigns each state to one of six geographical regions for the purpose of determining Executive Council composition; Annex 2 contains the criteria used to identify the states required to have deposited their instruments of ratification before the Treaty may enter into force, as well as a list of those states. The Protocol consists of three parts: Part I details on the International Monitoring System (IMS); Part II on On-Site Inspections (OSI); and Part III on Confidence Building Measures. Annex 1 to the Protocol details the location of treaty monitoring assets associated with the IMS; and Annex 2 details parameters for screening events.

Verification and inspections. The Treaty's verification regime consists of an International Monitoring System composed of seismological, radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound monitoring; consultation and clarification; on-site inspections; and confidence-building measures. The use of national technical means, vital for the Treaty's verification regime, is explicitly provided for. Requests for on-site inspections must be approved by at least 30 affirmative votes of the members of the Treaty's 51-member Executive Council, which must act within 96 hours of receiving a request for an inspection. At the present time, 273 of the 337 monitoring facilities comprising the IMS have been built, and 246 have been certified as meeting all requirements.

Treaty compliance and sanctions. The Treaty provides

for measures to redress a situation of concern, to ensure compliance with the Treaty (including the ability to recommend sanctions), and for the settlement of disputes. If the Conference of States Parties or the Executive Council determines that a case is of particular gravity, it can bring the issue to the attention of the United Nations.

Amendments. Any State Party to the Treaty may propose an amendment to the Treaty, the Protocol, or the Annexes to the Protocol. Amendments are considered by an Amendment Conference and are adopted by a positive vote of a majority of the States Parties with no State Party casting a negative vote. Amendments enter into force for all States parties after deposit of the instruments of ratification or acceptance by all those States parties casting a positive vote at the Amendment Conference.

Entry into force. The CTBT will enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty. Annex 2 lists the 44 states that are members of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as of June 18, 1996, with nuclear power and/or research reactors. If the Treaty has not entered into force three years after the date of the anniversary of its opening for signature (i.e., three years after September 24, 1996), a conference of the States which already have deposited their instruments of ratification may convene annually to consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the Treaty's early entry into force.

Review. Ten years after entry into force, a Conference

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Duration. The CTBT is of unlimited duration. Each State Party has the right to withdraw from the CTBT if it decides that extraordinary events related to its subject matter of the CTBT have jeopardized its supreme interests.

Depositary. The Secretary General of the United Nations is the Depositary for this Treaty and receives signatures, instruments of ratification and instruments of accession.

CTBTO Preparatory Commission

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission is based in Vienna, Austria, and is responsible for carrying out the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the CTBT and for preparing for the first session of the Conference of the States Parties to the CTBT. All countries which have signed the CTBT are considered to be members of the Preparatory Commission. In addition to these members, the Commission includes a Provisional Technical Secretariat, which has the following duties: (1) it is responsible for the overall installation, operations, and maintenance of the IMS; (2) it operates the International Data Centre, which receives data from IMS stations and produces monitoring data products; (3) it supports the on-site inspection function; and (4) it provides other support to the members of the Commission. Information about the Preparatory Commission can be found on its website www.ctbto.org.

[11](#)21. Fact Sheet: Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

The United States has not produced highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons since 1964 and halted the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons in 1988. The United States strongly believes that achieving a legally binding ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons is an important goal. A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would ban

the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

During the 1990's, many saw an FMCT as the next logical step on nuclear disarmament after the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban-Treaty, which was completed in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva in 1996. After considerable effort, the CD began negotiations on an FMCT toward the end of its 1998 session. In 1999, the CD proved unable to reach agreement for continuing FMCT negotiations, a condition that has persisted to the present time.

In late 2002, the Bush Administration issued its "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction," which affirmed U.S. support for the "negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) that advances U.S. security interests." On July 29, 2004, then-U.S. Ambassador to the CD Jackie Wolcott Sanders delivered a statement to the CD reporting that a U.S. policy review had concluded that an effectively verifiable FMCT was not achievable. During late August/early September 2004, U.S. experts traveled to Geneva to brief CD delegations on the reasoning behind these conclusions, and to emphasize that an FMCT having no international verification provisions would be preferable to one with less than effective verification.

On May 19, 2006, the U.S. tabled at the CD a draft text of an FMCT, as well as a draft mandate for FMCT negotiations which omitted any requirement that an FMCT resulting from the negotiations be "effectively verifiable. Prior to tabling these texts, the United States had consulted with key CD member governments to preview the U.S. proposals.

Subsequently, the U.S. continued to press the case for its draft text as a basis for negotiations in the CD, stressing that the proposed mandate did not preclude others from raising the issue of verification and expressing a willingness to further explain its position. However, the insistence by a small number of CD members on linking FMCT negotiations with other, unrelated issues which do not enjoy a consensus in Geneva continues to stymie action in the CD on FMCT.

President Obama has stated his administration's support for international negotiations for a verifiable treaty to end the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. He also has stressed the importance of cutting off the building blocks needed for nuclear weapons, stating, "if we are

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122. Should questions arise regarding the Nuclear Posture Review:

- As mandated by the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, the Department of Defense is preparing to conduct the Nuclear Posture Review which is due to Congress concurrent with the Quadrennial Defense Review in January 2010.
- The Department is in the early stages of organizing for the NPR, which will address the United States' nuclear deterrence strategy and policy, including the role of nuclear forces in U.S. national security strategy as well as the requirements and objectives for the United States to maintain a safe, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrence posture.
- As required by the Congress, the review will be an

interagency effort with Department of State and
Department of Energy participation.

- DoD will consult closely with Congress and allies
as the review process unfolds.

¶23. Minimize considered.

CLINTON